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Abstract—In this paper we investigate the problem of optimal
cache placement in the presence of malicious mobile users in het-
erogeneous networks, where small-cell base stations are equipped
with caches in order to reduce the overall backhaul load. In
particular the malicious users aim at maximizing the congestion
of files at the backhaul, i.e., at maximizing the average backhaul
rate. For that adversarial model, we derive the achievable average
backhaul rate of the heterogeneous network. Moreover, we study
the system performance from a game-theoretic perspective, by
naturally considering a zero-sum Stackelberg game between
the macro-cell base station and the malicious users. We then
thoroughly investigate the system performance in the presence
of adversaries and we analyze the influence of the system
parameters, such as the network topology and the capabilities of
the small-cell base stations, on the overall performance of edge
caching at the Stackelberg equilibrium. Our results highlight the
impact of the malicious users on the overall caching performance
of the network and they furthermore show the importance of an
adversary-aware content placement at the small-cell base stations.
I. INTRODUCTION
A promising technique for future 5G wireless networks [1]
consists of caching content at the wireless edge, as proposed in
[2]. The concept of edge caching emerges from the possibility
of significantly reducing the backhaul traffic and thus the
latency in content retrieval by bringing the content closer to
the end users, e.g. mobile users. Building on the expected
capabilities of future multi-tier networks [3], also referred to as
heterogeneous networks (HetNets), several recent works have
investigated the potential benefits of caching data in densely
deployed small-cell base stations (SBS) equipped with storage
capabilities, as in, e.g., [4], called caching HetNets.
In order to analyze the performance limits and trade-offs of
caching in wireless networks, several perspectives have been
envisaged. In particular, the information-theoretic perspective
has gained considerable traction in recent years, for example
in [5], where caching metrics are defined and analyzed for
large networks. In [6], the authors study the fundamental
performance limits of caching using network coding tech-
niques. Other frameworks have been used to analyze caching
networks, e.g. in [7] where the problem of cache content
placement is studied in terms of outage probability. Another
particularly important performance measure for edge caching
is the overall energy consumption, or equivalently the global
energy efficiency of the network. Numerous works have inves-
tigated the performance of caching from an energy perspective:
in [8] it was shown that caching at the edge provides significant
gains in terms of energy efficiency while in [9], the authors
study the tradeoff between transport and caching energy.
While the topic of wireless networks in the presence of
adversaries has been deeply studied in the last decade, see e.g.
[10], the interest in the security of caching HetNets against
attackers has only grown recently. Moreover, most of the
works which have investigated adversarial models in HetNets
limited themselves to passive eavesdropping, i.e. the secrecy
metric was considered. For instance in [11], the secrecy of
HetNets without caching is studied while in [12] secrecy
in caching networks is investigated from an information-
theoretic perspective. In [13] the secrecy of device-to-device
networks is studied while in [14] the authors introduced several
eavesdropper models in caching HetNets.
Departing from these works and building on the model
introduced in [15], where the caching strategy was optimized
with respect to backhaul load minimization without malicious
users, we consider in this paper a novel model of adversaries
aiming at maximizing the backhaul load. We thoroughly
investigate this model in the paper and, namely, our main
contributions are the following:
• We formally define the problem of caching at the wireless
edge for HetNets with malicious mobile users.
• We derive the achievable average backhaul rate and we
investigate the system caching performance from a game-
theoretic perspective. In particular we study the pure-
strategy Stackelberg game between the macro-cell base
station and the adversaries.
• We thoroughly investigate the performance of the optimal
secure scheme for a HetNet scenario of interest using
numerical simulations.
• Our results highlight the considerable effect of the pres-
ence of malicious users on the performance of edge
caching, as well as its impact on the optimal caching
scheme in the Stackelberg game equilibrium.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we define
our system model, caching scheme and performance measures.
In Section III, we derive the achievable backhaul rate in the
presence of adversaries. In Section IV, we analyze the network
from a game-theoretic perspective. In Section V we thoroughly
investigate the performance of our optimal schemes and we
compare it to other caching schemes in a heterogeneous
network scenario. Finally, Section VI concludes this paper.
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Fig. 1. Heterogeneous network.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
In this section, we describe the heterogeneous network and
the caching scheme investigated throughout the paper.
A. Network Model
In the following, we consider the network illustrated in
Fig. 1, where a macro-cell base station (MBS) serves the
requests of U wireless users. This network model is similar
to the model in [15], with one fundamental difference. Indeed
we assume that there exist in the network Ua = αU adversary
mobile users, with α ∈ [0, 1], whose goal is to disrupt the
system. In particular, their aim is to maximize the congestion
of files at the backhaul, i.e., to maximize the backhaul rate,
which will be formally defined in Section III. We should note
that this adversarial model can also accurately represent a
scenario where the MBS does not have correct information
on the file popularity distribution, and hence is assuming the
worst-case scenario in order to optimize file placement.
Users request files belonging to a library of N files, F =
{F1, . . . , FN}, each of size B bits. Since files can be divided
into blocks of the same size, the assumption of equally sized
files is justifiable. We divide the wirless users in two sets,
Ul and Ua which represent the set of legitimate and adversary
users, respectively. The (1−α)U legitimate users in Ul request
files according to a known file popularity distribution p =
{p1, . . . , pN}, where file Fj is requested with probability pj .
On the other hand, the Ua = αU adversary users in Ua request
files according a different strategy, which will be discussed in
Section IV. In the figures, legitimate users are represented in
yellow, while adversary users are drawn in red.
In order to serve user requests within short distance, NSBS
small-cell base stations are deployed in the coverage range of
the MBS. Each SBS is equipped with a cache of size M ·B bits
(i.e., it can store up to M < N complete files). We assume
that content is delivered without errors as long as a user is
within the coverage range of the base station. Each user u ∈
SBS1
SBS2
SBS3
SBS4
Fig. 2. Small cell topology.
{1, . . . , U} requests for a file in F , and each request is initially
served by the du SBSs within the coverage range with the
cache content. In the following, we call γi the probability
for a user to be served by du = i SBSs, which depends on
its location and on the deployment of the SBSs in the area
(see Fig. 2). If the requested file is not completely present in
the SBSs’ caches, the missing data has to be recovered by the
MBS and sent to the user via the backhaul link, thus increasing
the backhaul traffic. The purpose of caching files at the SBSs
is then to minimize this backhaul rate, i.e., the number of bits
that the MBS has to send directly to the users.
B. Coded Caching Scheme
A caching scheme can be divided into two phases, namely
the placement phase and the delivery phase. In the placement
phase, the SBSs caches are filled according to the chosen
placement strategy. This phase typically occurs at a moment
with a low amount of network traffic, e.g. at night. In the
delivery phase, the users send requests for files in the library,
which are initially served by the SBSs covering their locations.
If the SBSs cannot send enough information for the users
to recover the file, the MBS has to retrieve the missing
information through the backhaul and deliver it to the users.
In [15], the authors showed that storing MDS encoded
packets is always better than storing fragments in terms of
retrieval probability. For MDS(k, n) codes, such as Reed-
Solomon (RS) codes, k ≥ n encoded packets are created
such that any subset of n packets are necessary and sufficient
to recover the initial information. As a consequence, in the
following we will study the performance of a MDS coded
caching scheme.
Each file of the library is initially split into n fragments,
i.e., Fj = {f (j)1 , · · · , f (j)n } for all 1 ≤ j ≤ N . The caching
scheme is then defined as follows:
1) Placement phase: The MBS uses the n fragments of
each file to create kj = n + (NSBS − 1)mj encoded
packets using a MDS code, sending mj of them to each
SBS. We note that the MBS keeps n − mj encoded
packets unsent. Each SBS receives mj different encoded
packets for each file Fj to be stored in its cache, with
m = [m1 · · ·mN ] and
∑
jmj ≤M .
2) Delivery phase: A user, requesting for file Fj , and
within coverage range of du ≥ 1 SBSs, receives mjdu
different encoded packets. If mjdu ≥ n, the file can be
recovered by the user due to the MDS-property of codes.
Otherwise, the MBS has to send the remaining n−mjdu
encoded packets from its collection of encoded packets.
Due to the MDS-property of the codes, the user does
not receive replicated packets, and it can hence recover
the requested file.
III. AVERAGE BACKHAUL RATE
In this section, we derive the average backhaul rate per
user in the heterogeneous network with malicious users. In the
following, we denote by q the proportional placement of files
stored in the SBSs caches, i.e., q , m/n. Hence qj = mj/n
represents the proportion of file Fj stored in the caches.
If we denote by Rl the average rate of a legitimate user
ul ∈ Ul and Ra is the average rate of an adversary user ua ∈
Ua, the total average backhaul rate of the system is given by
R¯ = αRa + (1− α)Rl. (1)
A. Derivation of Rl
The average backhaul rate of a user requesting files ac-
cording to a distribution p can be calculated according to the
following Proposition in [15]:
Proposition 1 ( [15] Prop. 1). The average backhaul rate for
an encoded caching placement scheme CMDSm defined by the
placement q = [q1 · · · qN ] with expected requests vector p can
be calculated as
R(CMDS
q
) =
S∑
d=1
N∑
j=1
γdpj max (1− dqj , 0) , (2)
where S ≤ NSBS is the maximum number of SBSs serving
a user. Hence, the average backhaul rate of a legitimate user
can be calculated as
Rl =
S∑
d=1
N∑
j=1
γdpj max (1− dqj , 0) . (3)
B. Derivation of Ra
Similarly, we can derive the average backhaul rate of an
adversary user ua ∈ Ua as
Ra =
S∑
d=1
N∑
j=1
γdpˆj max (1− dqj , 0) , (4)
where pˆj is the popularity of file j induced by the requests
of the adversaries. This result can be described in a different
manner by writing the average backhaul rate of an adversarial
user as
Ra =
1
|Ua|
|Ua|∑
u=1
S∑
d=1
γdmax (1− dqju , 0) ,
where ju is the file requested by malicious user u. This
description is equivalent to the one of Equation (4).
IV. GAME-THEORETIC ANALYSIS
In this section we analyze the competitive interaction be-
tween the Ua adversaries and the MBS using a game-theoretic
framework, which is especially suitable for our scenario.
A. Definition of the Game
Formally, we define the Stackelberg game G between the
MBS and the malicious users as follows:
• Leader: the MBS, with utility function UMBS = −R¯
and strategy space given by the placement scheme q =
[q1, . . . , qN ];
• Follower: the Ua malicious users, with utility function
Uadv = −UMBS = R¯ and strategy space j = [j1, . . . , jUa ],
i.e., the files requested by each malicious user.
B. Solution of the Game
In this section, we solve the Stackelberg game defined
previously. Note that we restrict the strategy space of players
to pure strategies, i.e. we do not consider mixed strategies for
the MBS; this restriction is justifiable from practical system
considerations.
Proposition 2. The Stackelberg game G has a unique solution
(q∗, j∗), leading to a utility R¯(q∗, j∗).
Proof: Each player aims to maximize its own utility. In
particular, the Ua malicious users, acting as the follower of the
Stackelberg game G, solve first the following optimization:
max
j
R¯, (5)
for q fixed. We can easily derive that ∀q and ∀u ∈ Ua, the
optimal strategy of u is given by
j∗u(q) = argmin
i
q(i), (6)
i.e., the optimal strategy of every attacker is to request for
the file j∗ with minimal q(j∗). This result can also be readily
obtained by deriving ∂R¯
∂qju
. Hence, the request distribution of
adversary users is given by
pˆ∗j =
{
1 if j = j∗
0 otherwise.
As a consequence, the expected backhaul rate for an adversary
user can be simplified as
Ra =
S∑
d=1
γdmax (1− dqj∗ , 0) (7)
=
S∑
d=1
γdmax (1− dmin(q), 0) . (8)
Now the MBS as the leader of the Stackelberg game solves
R¯(q∗, j∗) = min
q
R¯(q, j∗) (9)
= min
q
(1− α)
S∑
d=1
N∑
j=1
γdpj max (1− dqj , 0)
+ α
S∑
d=1
γdmax (1− dmin(q), 0) . (10)
Equation (10) is convex in q and hence the minimization
problem minq R¯(q, j∗) admits a solution q∗ which concludes
the proof of the proposition.
The extreme cases α → 0 and α → 1 are of particular
interest and are discussed in the next section.
C. Extreme Cases
a) No malicious user, α→ 0: If α→ 0, according to (1)
we have that R¯→ Rl. In this case, the number of adversaries
is negligible compared to the number of legitimate users, and
the objective function of the optimization problem turns out
to be the same of [15].
b) No legitimate user, α→ 1: If α→ 1, the Stackelberg
equilibrium strategy of the MBS, given by Equation (10)
becomes:
min
q
S∑
d=1
γdmax (1− dmin(q, 0)). (11)
This represents the worst-case scenario, where all the users are
adversaries. In this case, the MBS has to solve the optimization
problem (11) which is equivalent after some manipulations to
max
q
(
min
j
(qj)
)
,
for which the Stackelberg equilibrium strategy is given by the
uniform solution, i.e.,
q∗ =
[
M
N
. . .
M
N
]
. (12)
The Stackelberg equilibrium results in that case in the utility:
R¯(q∗, j∗) =
S∑
d=1
γdmax
(
1− dM
N
, 0
)
. (13)
V. NUMERICAL ILLUSTRATIONS
In this section we investigate the performance of the het-
erogeneous network in terms of backhaul rate of our coded
caching scheme in the presence of adversary users. We evalu-
ate the performance in a HetNet topology of particular interest,
and we should note that our numerical results can be further
generalized to any network topology.
A. Network Topology
We consider the heterogeneous network depicted in Fig. 1.
In this scenario, the MBS has a coverage area of radius of
D = 500 meters. The SBSs are deployed in a regular grid,
with a distance d = 60 meters between SBSs. Each SBS has
a coverage area of radius r, with d/
√
2 ≤ r ≤ d. This means
that the coverage areas of the SBSs are overlapping, as shown
in Fig. 2, which corresponds to S = 4.
Considering a uniform density ρ of the users, the value of γd
is calculated from the sum of the coverage areas. In practice,
if we call Ad the sum of the areas where a user can be served
by d SBSs, the probability γd that a user is served by d SBSs
is given by
γd =
Ad∑S
i=1Ai
.
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Fig. 3. Average backhaul rate as a function of the adversaries proportion α,
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We consider a uniform distribution of the users, with
density ρ = 0.05 users/m2. Using these values corresponds
to 316 small-cell base stations being deployed, covering
U = 39, 269 mobile users. The request probability of the files
p = [p1 · · · pN ] for the legitimate users u ∈ Ul is distributed
according to a Zipf law of parameter z, i.e.,
pj =
1/jz∑
j 1/j
z
,
where z represents the skewness of the distribution [16].
B. Numerical Results
In the following, we study the performance of the coded
cache placement in the presence of adversary users u ∈ Ua.
The library contains N = 200 files, whose popularity for legit-
imate users follows a Zipf distribution of parameter z = 0.7.
In Figure 3, we show the average backhaul rate R¯(q∗, j∗)
in the Stackelberg equilibrium as a function of the fraction of
adversaries α. Each curve is calculated for a different value
of the coverage range of the SBSs r. As a reference, we also
show the backhaul rate of the uniform and the optimal caching
placement presented in [15], i.e., the Stackelberg equilibrium
strategies for α = 1 and α = 0, respectively. As expected, the
average backhaul rate grows with the number of adversaries. It
is interesting to note that r has a linear impact on the backhaul
rate, where the rate approximately decreases by 0.04 per meter
of coverage. Moreover, by comparing the curves with the
optimal caching strategies, we see that each curve is initially
similar to the optimal caching strategy without adversaries,
and finally converges to the uniform strategy. This highlights
the existence of three regimes depending on α:
• 0 < α < α
(1)
thr : The Stackelberg equilibrium strategy of
the MBS is independent of the malicious users’ attacks,
i.e. the MBS minimizes Rl.
• α
(1)
thr < α < α
(2)
thr : The MBS should adaptively optimize
its placement depending on α.
• α
(2)
thr < α < 1: The MBS is forced to choose the minimax
solution, i.e., the uniform placement.
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Figure 4 depicts the average backhaul rate as a function
of the fraction of adversaries α with varying parameter the
cache size M . As before, the number of adversaries has an
impact on the backhaul rate. However, the larger is the size
M of the cache, the less impactful the attacks are. This is
due to the fact that the optimal caching strategy in case of
α = 1 is to store fragments uniformly, which is far away
from the optimal caching placement if the cache size is small
[15]. Moreover, the points where the curve branches off from
the optimal caching and gathers the uniform strategy seems to
depend on the cache size M . To study in detail the behavior of
the branching and gathering point, we depicted them as green
and red circles, corresponding to α(1)thr and α
(2)
thr , respectively.
Surprisingly, the larger the cache size, the smaller α(1) and
α(2) are. This is due to the fact that, as shown in Figure 3, the
penalty of using a uniform placement is not so important in
case of large cache size. In this case, the large cache size
provides the possibility to timely react to the presence of
adversaries, slightly changing the values of the number of
fragments stored. On the other hand, if the cache size is small,
the presence of a small number of adversaries does not have a
large impact on the caching system, since the uniform caching
performs far worse than the optimal strategy. In this case, it is
better to keep the optimal strategy even in presence of a small
number of adversaries, since the small size of the cache does
not offer the possibility to substitute many packets.
To study in detail the behavior of the branching and gather-
ing point, in Figure 5 we show the entries of q∗ as a function
of α. In the Figure, we highlight the values of the minimum
entry q∗1 , the maximum entry q∗200 and the entry q∗µ, with
µ , maxµ(q(µ) 6= 0). For α = 0, we have that q∗200 = 0,
since the popularity of file F200 is too small to be stored in
such a small cache. For a similar reason, q∗1 = 1, since the
file is so popular that it has to be stored in every cache. The
other files have a different amount of fragments stored. We
should note that for α = 0, the solution of the optimization
problem of [15] has a very regular structure, as we observe that
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q∗ = [1, 12 , . . .
1
S
. . . 0]. Around α(1)thr = 0.32, the penalty due
to the adversaries starts to have an impact on the performance
of the system, hence the less popular files begin to be stored.
Since all the adversaries ask for the less stored file, all these
low popular files tend to have the same number of fragment
stored. As the ratio of adversaries α grows, more files lose
fragments in favor of less popular ones. Around α(2)thr = 0.93,
all the files have the same number of fragments stored, and the
uniform caching strategy is reached, i.e., the extreme α → 1
scenario described in Section IV-C.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
We investigated the problem of MDS-encoded content
placement at the cache-equipped small-cell base stations at the
wireless edge in the presence of malicious end users. First, we
derived the achievable average backhaul rate for our scenario
with adversaries. We then investigated the competitive inter-
action between the macro-cell base station and the malicious
users from a Stackelberg game perspective, for which we
derived the Stackelberg equilibrium in the general case and
in the worst-case scenario. We then thoroughly analyzed the
performance of caching at the wireless edge in the presence
of malicious users for a relevant heterogeneous scenario by
comparing it to the optimal placement without adversaries and
to an uniform placement, which was shown to be optimal when
the number of adversaries grows large. We also studied the
influence of the key parameters, such as the capabilities of the
small-cell base stations and the network topology. Our findings
showed the negative impact of the presence of attackers on
the caching performance and also showed the existence of
three regimes depending on the fraction of adversaries α.
Hence our results showed the crucial importance of optimizing
adaptively content placement depending on the number of
malicious users. Further work will include the estimation of the
number of attackers depending on the request distribution, and
the use of a different game-theoretic framework to account for
the uncertainty on the players’ strategies, e.g. Bayesian game
models.
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